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SETTING THE MARKET FREE; DEREGULATION OF THE BUS INDUSTRY 
Though he was not himself an economist, Reuben Smeed is well 
known to transport economists as the chairman of a committee 
which, in the early sixties, examined the use of congestion 
charges to obtain a rational use of scarce urban road 
capacity. (1) The Smeed report showed that in the absence of a 
proper road congestion pricing system there would be an excessive 
use of the private car, and, by implication, a sub optimum level 
of use of public transport. Although, to the best of my 
knowledge, Reuben never turned his mind to the issues of public 
transport regulation, the ready acceptance of public transport 
regulation and subsidy as second best proxies for road pricing in 
the late sixties and seventies was, I believe, founded on the 
Smeed logic. 
The regulation of public transport has, of course, other roots. 
In the nineteen twenties and thirties there was a belief that a 
free market would yield an excessive supply with the result that 
load factors would be low and the average cost per passenger 
carried unduly high. This was the basis for entry regulation. In 
the sixties and seventies there also developed a concern that in 
the absence of control some categories of person - the old, the 
young and the infirm, as well as those too poor to own cars - 
would suffer a progressive immiseration in the process of growth 
of incomes and car ownership. This was the basis for using the 
price and entry controls to enforce the internal cross-subsidy of 
unremunerative services. Hence from 1930 to 1980 the public 
interest theory of regulation -the idea that regulation could be 
framed so as to promote the public interest - dominated poltical 
and economic thinking about local bus services. 
The adverse effects of regulation have also long been recognised. 
In the early seventies A.E.Kahn, later to become famous as the 
President of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, spelled out the 
dangers of slackness in management, exploitation of the monopoly 
power of organised labour, overinvestment, and lack of innovation 
flourishing behind a statutory monopoly barrier.(2) In Britain, 
in the same vein, the 1984 White Paper 11Buses1g(3) argued that 
half a century of regulation had led to excessively high costs, 
inadequate innovation and a structure of internal cross-subsidy 
which was both inequitable (as it involved the poor subsidising 
the better off) and inefficient (as it involved resources being 
devoted to the maintenance of services for which there was little 
current demand or development potential). 
The dilemma of regulation was thus that whilst it inevitably had 
adverse effects on the internal efficiency of regulated firms it 
still appeared necessary in order to secure an efficient 
structure of production and allocation of resources . As the 
political balance shifted towards emphasising the operational 
inefficiency of regulated regimes, there developed a desire to 
find a theoretical escape from the need to regulate. 
The Gordian knot finally appeared to be broken in the early 
eighties with the development of the theory of contestable 
markets. The theory was most concisely stated by Professor 
W.J.Baumo1 in his 1982 presidential address to the American 
Economic Association. (4) He argued that, so long as there are 
no 'sunk costs1 involved in entering the market, and there is 
absolutely no constraint on the freedom of entry, then only 
internally efficient firms, of the optimum scale and structure, 
with an optimal product mix and no cross-subsidy can survive. 
Hence the task of government should not be to attempt to 
determine the optimal structure of production and to protect it 
but to ensure that there are no constraints on free entry to 
limit the credibility of the competitive threat. If the 
conditions of contestability obtain, he argued, even monopolists 
must behave as though they were subject to actual competition in 
order to avoid attracting new entry which would destroy them. 
The 1984 Buses White paper argued that the bus industry fits this 
bill well and that most of the problems of the industry would be 
overcome so long as the statutory restrictions on entry were 
eliminated. That philosophy was implemented in the 1985 
Transport Act which combined the abolition of regulation on entry 
to the stage bus market with privatisation and fragmentation of 
the National Bus Company and the reconstitution of the 
municipally owned companies so that they had no initial advantage 
in the new competitive framework. Any operator able to satisfy 
the remaining quality controls could offer whatever service he 
chose on a commercial basis. Local authorities retained the 
power to supplement the commercially provided services if they 
felt that necessary on social grounds, but only on the basis of 
competitive tendering. Competition, both on the road and in the 
tendering process was thus to be the order of the day. The 
market was to be set free. 
The White Paper, and the Act which followed, have been the 
subject of much debate (5), one of the most contentious issues of 
which has been whether the bus market is truly contestable. 
Why, it may be asked, should so much importance attach to so 
arcane an issue? The reason is this. If the market is truly 
contestable then, to paraphrase Voltaire, Inall is for the best in 
the best of possible (i.e. completely free) worlds.I1 Most of the 
economic or technical opposition to deregulation collapses. If 
the market does not possess all of the desirable characteristics 
of perfect contestability we may still need to concern ourselves 
with both the structure of the market and with the processes of 
competition if the best is to be obtained from deregulation. 
My lecture this evening therefore addresses four related issues; 
(i) What a priori evidence is there that the bus market is 
highly contestable, and how well have the provisions of 
the Act promoted contestability? 
(ii) Is market contestability a sufficient condition for 
welfare maximisation? 
(iii) What additional light does the behaviour of firms 
during the first year of deregulation shed on these 
issues? 
(iv) What morals for the market control mechanisms would I 
draw from the analysis? 
1. Is the bus market inherentlv contestable? 
(a) The technological conditions 
According to Baumol, the essential technological requirement for 
a market to be-contestable is that there are no sunk costs; that 
is that any investment necessary in order to enter the market can 
be fully recouped on exit. For many products the necessary 
capital equipment is fixed and highly specific; once set in place 
cannot easily be used for any other purpose or resold. In such 
circumstances the irreconcilability of fixed cost with the 
requirement of zero sunk cost makes contestability theory 
inapplicable. 
In bus transport, however, the essential capital asset is the 
vehicle, which is by its nature versatile. It can serve 
different geographic markets. It may be cascaded from more to 
less demanding uses and a lively second hand market may provide 
the alternative escape of selling the asset and quitting the bus 
market altogether. The second hand market also offers a route to 
entry despite some initial attempts by large operators to stifle 
the flow of vehicles into the second hand bus market and hence 
create a barrier to entry. The basic technological requirements 
for contestability thus appear to obtain in the bus industry. 
There may be other types of sunk cost however. Because transport 
is a service which cannot be stored potential passengers must be 
informed before production starts. That implies some 
promotional expenses which are inevitably sunk and also that 
there may be initial losses to be sustained in the process of 
developing market awareness. On already densely served routes 
these costsmay be small as the new entrant may simply compete 
for the randomly arriving passenger; in effect he takes advantage 
of the incumbents existing marketing information. On thinner 
routes a more positive marketing effort may be required. 
Uncertainty concerning the magnitude of these costs may be 
sufficient to inhibit small new entrants. 
Contestability theory also assumes the possibility of instant 
entry at optimal scale. But this may not be easy to achieve if 
there is a dominant incumbent offering an extensive, high 
frequency network using travelcards and other operator specific 
multi-journey ticketing schemes to secure loyalty. Such devices 
may give the incumbent some protection against piecemeal 
competition. The implication of this would sem to be that the 
maintenance of area wide, rather than company specific, 
multijourney ticketing schemes may be in the best interest of the 
travelling public, despite the fact that it implies a wider 
residual role for the local authority. 
(b) The institutional conditions. 
Institutionally, contestability theory would suggest that so long 
as there is no statutory constraint on entry the initial market 
structure does not matter as incumbents have no alternative, in 
the interests of survival, but to behave in ways which are in the 
customers best interest. The historic evidence - of competitive 
practices in the unregulated markets of the late twenties and the 
long period of instability in the Hereford city trial area of the 
early eighties, - belies the applicability of that analysis to 
the bus industry. As part of the deregulation package attention 
was therefore paid to the ownership, size, and internal structure 
of incumbents. 
(i) Ownershiv, 
It was deemed necessary to reconstitute municipally owned 
firms as normal entreprises under Companies Act legislation, 
on terms which did not unduly favour them in the market, and 
to prohibit any direct subsidy being paid to them by the 
local authority owner to keep them solvent. 
It has subsequently been argued that municipally owned 
companies retain some unfair advantage. They do not have 
to pay a dividend, and if they have inherited a reasonably 
modern fleet of vehicles may be able to remain solvent 
for .a long period of unprofitable operation. New entrants, 
especially if they obtain equipment on leases which 
effectively convert their capital charges into an operating 
cost, may thus find themselves at some disadvantage, despite 
apparently being the lower cost operator. 
(ii) corn~anv size, 
Deregulation was acccompanied by fragmentation of the 
National Bus Company, with initial rules for the sale of the 
fragmented NBC companies which did not permit purchase by 
any other operator in the area of the company being sold. 
There are two quite different justifications which might be 
offered for this. Firstly, fragmentation might be seen as 
one way of ensuring that there were enough experienced 
independent operators in existence for the initial 
competitive threat to be effective. Secondly, there might 
be a fear that the continued existence of a large dominant 
operator would be a situation in which cross-subsidy, and 
the protection of dominance by predatory practice would 
flourish. The first of these arguments is consistent with a 
belief that the bus market is inherently contestable, the 
second is not. 
(iii) Internal structure, 
One potential distortions of a regulated system, elegantly 
demonstrated in theory by Averch and Johnson ( 6 ) ,  is the 
inducement to excessive expansion of the capital base and to 
an uneconomic level of vertical integration. The converse 
of this, argued by Beesley and Glaister(7), is that 
deregulation of an inherently contestable market makes 
nossible the emeraence of new contractual arranaements and 
forms of organisa<ion which redefine the boundaries of the 
firm to the advantage of the consumer. In the sale of NBC 
assets a number of different types of package have 
accordingly been created, partly in response to market 
demand. 
(c) External relationships 
As part of the deregulation package some local authorities have 
become both the customer for tendered services and the sole 
shareholder of one of the competing contractors. The 
reconstitution of the municipally owned companies as normal 
commercial enterprises, the embargo on direct subsidy from the 
owning authority, and the requirement of the authorities not to 
show preference in the allocation of tenders were intended to be 
the basis on which the two apparently conflicting interests of 
the local authorities were to be reconciled. In the metropolitan 
areas the planning function of the PTE's have been divorced from 
operations, in two separate organisations with differing, and 
often conflicting professional objectives. 
At the political level the distinction is not so clear. The 
the local authority or PTA can decide what supplementation of the 
commercial network to provide, albeit within a budget which is 
limited by statute. It can also specify fares for tendered 
services, though again subject to the legal obligation not to act 
in such a way as to restrict competition. It has been alleged 
that the local authority can still favour the municipally owned 
operator in a limited way by the form in which tender invitations 
are specified, and by the use of minimum subsidy tenders (which 
give an advantage to the incumbent company which knows the 
current revenue levels) But it is not able to to retain the kind 
of comprehensive control which some authorities had previously 
exercised. 
In contrast, as sole shareholder of the company it is able to 
determine both the general objectives of the company and the 
level of discretion which is left to the Board of Directors in 
day to day management. The temptation to use those much less 
obviously restricted powers to try to retain traditional 
networks, fare levels, operating conditions, and the like is 
great. Of course, if the market is highly contestable such a 
strategy would be unsustainable and could lead to the ultimate 
bankruptcy of the company. If not, however, some of the 
potential benefits of deregulation might be lost as the authority 
attempts to favour its own company. 
2. Is contestabilitv sufficient for welfare maximisation? 
Let us now suppose that our doubts concerning the degree of 
market contestability are unfounded. Would we then be justified 
in assuming that market processes would automatically produce an 
outcome in the consumers best interest? 
The issue here is that the theory of contestable markets ignores 
many of the dimensions of market ,failure which underpin the 
traditional case for regulation. It assumes that only welfare 
optimal competitive practices are sustainable and that user cost 
economies of scale or scope, external effects such as congestion 
and income distribution effects are absent or can be handled by 
other , more direct, action. Let us examine these issues. 
(a) Competitive practices 
In contestable markets any successful competitive or competition 
pre-empting action is assumed to be in the public interest. In 
the bus industry , in contrast, there has been a traditional 
concern that the processes of commercial competition may actually 
involve practices , such as racing to stops, running just ahead 
of competitors scheduled buses, hanging back, turning short and 
missing stops, that are both antisocial and uneconomic. 
Foster and Golay (8 )  argue that most such wwcurious old practicesww 
are in fact either consistent with equilibrium and in the public 
interest (for example missing stops when the bus is full or near 
full and turning short when the bus is empty and there is a 
demand for service in the opposite direction) or can be 
adequately controlled by the requirements of the legislation (e.g 
maintaining published schedules which will ensure that 
competitors iterate rapidly to a position which they are 
satisfied to maintain). Whilst conceding that some of the old 
practices (such as headrunning and predatory loss-leading) may 
not be welfare optimal they argue that such practices will not 
survive. 
A more fundamental concern about the competitive process is 
whether the balance of service and fare changes which might 
result from freeing entry is socially optimum or not. Probably 
the most notable consequence of deregulation throughout the 
country has been the flowering of minibus services which have 
attracted new passengers, and have generally been popular. It 
is possible that the outcome on some routes at least will be the 
replacement of all or part of the traditional large bus service 
by minibuses offering higher frequency but at higher fares. 
Foster and Golay refer to this as being "in principle the main 
economic benefit of dereg~lation.~~ The question is whether the 
fact that minibuses survive, and in some cases drive out 
conventional buses necessarily means that welfare is improved. 
..... OMIT FROM ORAL PRESENTATION ..... 
The potential commercial viability of minibus services in Britain 
was explored by Bly and Oldfield (9) who suggested that they 
would do very well because of the increased frequency and reduced 
journey times that they were able to offer, irrespective of 
whether there was any differential in passengers values of time 
or fares. Glaister subsequently forecast the likely split of 
traffic between minibus and traditional bus services on a 
hypothetical London route(lO), and using real data for services 
in Aberdeen (11) .He concluded that small vehicles would play an 
important part in a deregulated industry even if, as he assumed, 
they operated at premium fares. In high flow areas he concluded 
that big bus services would remain, at lower fares, to offer a 
service to poorer people, and that the availability of a range of 
different service qualities at different fares would cater for 
people with different values of time to the public benefit. In 
low flow areas, however, he conceded that big bus services might 
be substantially reduced to the detriment of the lower income 
groups. Both Nash (12) and Galvez (13)have agreed that small 
buses could survive in a competitive world, but concluded that 
the possibility of them driving out big buses in circumstances 
where such an outcome was against the public interest was greater 
than suggested by Glaister. 
..... CONTINUE HERE..... 
At the heart of the issue lies the nature of the consumer 
decision making process. If there are sufficient passengers who 
because of the uncertainty about the arrival time of a cheaper 
bus, will board the first suitable bus to arrive, irrespective of 
the fare charged, then high frequency, even at high fares, will 
be commercially attractive to the operator. Once the process 
begins, the gulf between the fare/frequency combinations 
available may widen. The choice set will then not include the 
original relatively high frequency/low fare combination and the 
commercial emergence of the new product mix does not necessarily 
guarantee its social optimality, as Evans (14) has recently 
demonstrated. 
(b) Economies of scale and scope and user costs 
We have previously noted that in a truly contestable market the 
existence of scale or scope economies is no problem because 
immediate entry of an operator of optimal scale and scope is 
assumed to be costless. This is based on the assumption that 
sufficient of the benefits of scale or scope accrue to, or can be 
appropriated by the entrepreneur for them to be effective in 
determining what structure is most profitable, and hence able to 
survive. 
In the bus industry there may be some benefits of scale or scope 
which accrue to users which cannot be appropriated by producers. 
The "Mohring effect" of waiting time savings to passengers as 
route frequencies increase is the classical example. Similarly 
it has been argued that the maintenance of area wide fare scales, 
through ticketing arrangements and widely available system travel 
cards all yield benefits to the consumer but are not necessarily 
sustainable in a freely competitive market. 
On its own merits, the common fare scale does not appear to have 
a great deal to commend it, implying as it does the possibility 
of considerable, but uncontrolled cross-subsidy. But other 
arrangements such as the administration of a concessionary fares 
policy in a multi-operator environment and the maintenance of 
system wide travel card systems may become impossibly difficult 
in the context of very complicated competitively oriented fares 
structures. Moreover, there is clearly a threshold at which it 
becomes of commercial benefit to the larger operator to be able 
to use the company travel card as a competititive instrument 
offering loyalty rebates. 
(c) Congestion. 
The Department of Transport has argued that the replacement of 
large by more frequent small vehicles, would on balance reduce 
congestion by attracting passengers from cars. The conventional 
wisdom that there is little substitutability between public 
transport and cars was deemed inapplicable to a situation where 
the smaller buses were more closely able to replicate the speed, 
comfort and accessibility of the private car. However, as a 
second line of defence if that proved not to be true powers were 
to be given to the Traffic Commissioners to restrict buses where 
traffic management was demonstrated to be adversely affected. 
(d) Distribution 
As far as the distributional consequences of deregulation are 
concerned the formal position is that local authorities retain 
the power, within their current financial capabilities, to 
supplement commercial services through the tendering process. 
They also retain the powers to support concessionary fares 
schemes so long as those schemes do not discriminate between 
operators. They are no longer able to enforce preferred fares 
levels for commercial services, though some of the PTA's do 
appear to be trying to use their influence to maintain overall 
control on fares. 
3. What liqht does the first vear of exverience shed? 
Although it is still quite early in the game, it is already 
possible to make some observations on the way in which the 
deregulated markets are working. 
(a) The effect on costs 
It is already clear that the competitive threat, as well as 
actual competition on the road, has caused substantial revisions 
in working practices and reductions in real wage rates. In some 
of the metropolitan counties the ratio of bids to tenders in the 
first round was low and the prices relatively high. But 
competition does now appear to be intensifying and the pressure 
on costs increasing. Already in some places the transport unions 
have accepted increased use of part time labour, large 
differentials between traditional wage rates and the new minibus 
rates, and even differentials between the wage rates for new 
employees and for protected old employees doing the same job. 
The prior estimate of wage cost reductions of 30% do appear to 
have been achieved in many cases. 
The downward pressure on wage costs has been complemented by 
changes in product mix within a broadly stable total output, with 
a reduction of supply in the more costly and less well 
remunerated periods and locations. The fact that this has not 
enabled price reductions is partly because there has been a 
reduction in subsidy expenditures, but largely because increased 
frequencies and smaller vehicles on the more highly patronised 
routes has reduced the surpluses that they formerly generated. 
(b) Company structure 
Considerable restructuring also appears to be occurring. 
Technical services such as network design and computing, formerly 
thought to be sources of scale economies exclusively available to 
large operators, are now available at arms length, on a 
commercial basis. Some small operators have sought solutions to 
their problems of maintenance by buying in from the road haulage 
or light commercial vehicle sector, a prospect that becomes 
increasingly attractive with the move into minibuses; in the 
process of privatisation of NBC one of the packages which has 
proved to be marketable is a collection of apparently rather 
unattractive engineering facilities which the purchaser proposes 
to use to provide specialised engineering services on a common 
user basis. Bus suppliers and finance houses are beginning to 
provide vehicles on short leases which make it possible to 
separate the ownership of the capital assetsw from the management 
of labour in operations. This will undoubtedly facilitate more 
flexible uses of labour than has happened in the past, and 
reduces the capital risk to a calculable basis. 
(c) . Extent of on-the-road competition. 
The incidence of competition on the road can be understood in 
terms of four factors; 
(i) Characteristics of incumbent companies 
In deciding on a target entrants appear to be looking for 
situations in which existing fare levels are high or service 
levels low so that they may hope to be able both to generate 
and attract traffic by improving service. It is also an 
attraction if, for some reason, the incumbent appears 
unlikely or unable to retaliate. Insofar as the major 
competitive dimension has been service frequency and the 
instrument has been the minibus, companies who do not have 
a fleet of such vehicles may be tempting targets. 
Inability to retaliate may also obtain where an out of 
district operator attacks a municipal who is statutorily not 
permitted to go into totally new stage operating territory 
in retaliation. 
(ii) Characteristics of potential entrants. 
On the whole companies have tended to try to expand in areas 
where they have a base already, or where they have 
managerial knowledge. The latter characteristic seems to 
have been very influential, for example, in the strategies 
of the two major predators to date - UTB and Devon General. 
For large existing operators the availability of spare 
capacity may lead to diversification into other locations 
(as for example the Vectis move into Southampton) or other 
products (for example the moves of several small and medium 
size independents from contract and hire into stage 
business). Ownership also appears to be important. For 
example, the initial financial vulnerability of some NBC 
management buyouts, and the formal setting of non-aggressive 
objectives for former municipal companies has limited the 
initial extent of competition. For smaller entrants an 
existing base, and spare capacity appear to be important, 
though they appear to be particularly inclined to entry 
which is of low visibility (gap-filling rather than head on 
confrontation) and of low risk (tendering rather than 
commercial registration). In all cases entry has appeared 
more attractive where the entrant has no established market 
at risk to retaliation. 
(iii) Characteristics of the market territory 
The arrival of the manoeuvrable minibus has opened up some 
hitherto empty territories which are particularly attractive 
because of the belief that such entry is less likely to 
attract retaliation. Other areas of attraction are those 
which have historically been disputed (competition between 
Leicester and Midland Fox simply continues a historic 
rivalry), and those which are seen as very peripheral to the 
incumbents core. 
(iv) The historic relationship between potential competitors 
For the ex NBC companies potentially in a position to 
threaten a municipal or ex-PTE incumbents it may be 
considered prudent to ensure that they do not enter 
competitions that they cannot conclusively win. Given a 
high level of mutual understanding, particularly in the PTE 
areas where they have formerly operated jointly or in close 
collaboration, both parties may come to the correct 
conclusion, without registrable collaboration, that 
maintaining the historic division of territory without 
aggressive competition, is likely to be the most profitable 
strategy. At the other extreme, where relationships have 
traditionally been bad, and where there is no impediment to 
cross-subsidy, unsustainable levels of competition may 
persist. For example, experience in Strathclyde, where low 
levels of bus occupancy continue to be sustained by the 
major operators in a capacity war, suggests that substantial 
loss-making and cross-subsidy can exist. 
(d) Competitive practices 
The competitive behaviour of operators may also be simply 
characterised. Competition on the road has usually taken the 
form of increasing supply and improving service quality 
(particularly by the introduction of smaller vehicles and higher 
frequency operation) rather than reducing fares. Moreover, 
wherever it has been felt that there is some prospect that a new 
entrant might attack with minibuses there seems to have been a 
tendancy by the incumbents to anticipate that competition by 
obtaining their own minibuses, even where that has not been seen 
as the preferred outcome in the absence of competitive entry. 
Once the minibuses have been purchased they are then almost 
inevitably used, a process accentuated by the ability of 
managements to reduce real wages and tighten working conditions 
in the process of replacing large buses by minibuses. Hour1 y 
wage rates for minibus drivers appear to be 25-40% lower than 
those for conventional bus drivers, while the differences in 
working conditions and operating speeds accentuates this so that 
the cost per comparable bus mile of a minibus may, for the moment 
at least, be less than half of that of a conventional bus within 
the same organisation. 
(e) Integration and economies of scope 
Already the area wide travel cards are beginning to be replaced 
by single operator schemes in the metropolitan area. Other area 
wide services such as integrated timetable production suffer from 
similar dangers of commercial unsustainability, whilst appearing 
to be of clear benefit to consumers. Dominant operators may 
also feel that the provision of these services by the local 
authority is unfairly undermining one of the advantages of scale, 
or is simply inefficient. 
( f) Congestion 
The evidence on the creation of congestion is not clear. 
Minibuses do appear to have been able to attract patronage from 
cars in some cases, though our own research shows that this has 
occurred more out of the peak than at the peak. The generation 
and attraction capabilities of small vehicles also appear to have 
varied between types of location, with the effects being greatest 
where better penetration and more flexible operation has made it 
possible to tap the middle class discretionary trip market and 
least where the traditional heavy journey to work flows were 
concerned. 
In terms of the ability of the Traffic Commissioners to respond 
to problems when they do arise there can be some genuine 
difficulty. In the notorious case of Glasgow's Renfield Street, 
it was not possible to secure reductions by mutual consent of the 
operators and the Traffic Commissioner did not find it possible 
to impose restrictions without being in conflict with his 
obligation to operate even handedly between operators. In Tyne 
and Wear deregulation has recreated congestion on the Tyne Bridge 
which had been greatly reduced within an integrated system. 
4. What lessons can we draw for control? 
Let me now make my interpretations, and draw what lessons I can. 
(a) Contestability and the development of credible threats. 
Although the bus is a versatile asset which may not be regarded 
as a sunk cost in entering a market, the promotional costs and 
initial operational losses are likely to be irretrievably sunk by 
an intending entrant. It is the expected size of these, and the 
capacity of the intending entrant to sustain them, which deters 
entry. Entry to the core commercial network of another operator 
is perceived as high risk, likely to lead to a protracted period 
of mutual loss-making. The experience of even such an 
experienced, well-funded operator as UTB is hardly encouraging so 
far in terms of potential returns to competitive entry. Hence 
it is appearing rational to enter only if you are confident of 
supplanting the incumbent rapidly and cleanly, or if you have 
reason to believe that you can reach a quick accomodation. 
By the same token competition has initially been more prevalent 
in the tendered sector where the sunk costs are limited to the 
costs of putting the tender together, and where immediate 
commercial retaliation is less likely. So long as vehicle 
capacity is available all other costs are only incurred in the 
event of the tender being successful and a market niche 
guaranteed. Hence, competing in the tender market may seem much 
less risky than competing on the road. Whether, having 
established a foothold in stage services through successful 
tendering new entrants are then emboldened to expand into the 
commercial network, remains to be seen. One interpretation of 
the low tender prices which were achieved in the first round of 
tenders is that incumbents were particularly keen to prevent this 
happening, and were more willing to risk immediate attack on 
profitable commercial services by cross-subsidising the tendered 
services, than to allow tenders to be lost. Similarly, the 
retaliatory attacks on lost tenders by large operators may be 
construed as an attempt to raise the costs of entry. 
Of course this is not consistent with the contention that the 
market is truly contestable. The lesson is that obtaining and 
maintaining an appropriate market structure is of great 
importance in trying to get the most out of deregulation. 
Certainly there appears to be no clear criterion of what 
constitutes dangerous dominance. Already, in the more recent 
sales of NBC subsidiaries, there are beginning to emerge 
groupings of a size which certainly suggest considerable 
financial leverage, and even the elimination of potential 
competition between contiguous operators (e.g. East Yorkshire and 
West Yorkshire). Reagglomeration may also need to be 
controlled. 
(b) Competitive practices and the control of predation 
The prevalence of non-price competition in the commercial service 
market, and the apparent importance of the nature of the 
incumbent and potential entrants, suggest that the oligopoly 
analagy is more appropriate to the analysis of industry 
behaviour. Predatory practice has not disappeared, and it may 
well be the fear of predatory retaliation which explains the 
reluctance of small operators to compete in the core markets of 
major incumbents. Hence freeing entry has increased rather than 
reduced the need for regulatory overview of the sector. 
To meet that need the 1985 Act imposed on the bus industry the 
normal requirement to register with the OFT any practices which 
might be considered restrictive. However, the control of 
competitive practices is likely to be very difficult. For 
example, because the bus product is heterogeneous and complex the 
marginal costs and revenues of particular services may vary 
enormously over time and space. Hence it is difficult to know, 
without an extremely sophisticated enquiry, whether a particular 
action is predatory or not. The Office of Fair Trading has yet 
to prove its effectiveness in this area. Clear guidance on 
acceptable behaviour is required; perhaps progress might be made 
by requiring any operator introducing a service or pricing 
structure appearing prima facie to be predatory to maintain it 
for a prolonged minimum period as a condition for the retention 
of his operators licence. If OFT cannot cope with the extended 
and specialist work that is imposed on them it might be desirable 
to create an OFBUS to combine the kind of protective powers of 
parallel organisations in the newly privatised monopolies with 
specialised fair trading responsibilities. Careful attention 
now needs to be paid to developing - and publishing- standards of 
acceptable commercial behaviour in the industry. 
(c) External effects and planning powers 
Adverse externalities do not appear to have been adequately dealt 
with in the institutional arrangements. In particular the 
powers of local authorities to secure protection against 
congestion effects are inappropriate, and the Traffic 
Commissioners are themselves hamstrung by the need to act in a 
way which must primarily be seen as evenhanded between bus 
competitors rather than in the wider public interest. 
The institutional weakness here seems to be the linking of the 
powers to manage bus traffic on the streets with those to ensure 
effective competition in the bus market rather than with the 
other responsibilities for traffic management. In principle 
that looks like an easy problem to solve; in practice, because it 
would involve passing rather more powers over the local bus 
system back to the mistrusted urban local governments it appears 
to be rather a difficult step to take. That might be more 
acceptable if no operating company remained in municipal 
ownership. The PTA's and LA'S could then be given extended 
responsibility to plan the service networks without either the 
suspicion or reality of a conflict of interest. 
(d) Protecting the deprived. 
In the first round of tenders it appeared that a very large 
proportion of the original service level was being maintained 
whilst considerable reductions in subsidy cost had been achieved. 
But there have been substantial and I believe accelerating 
changes in the pattern of services with considerable loss of 
service at the less popular times of the day. The financial 
picture also seems to be changing a little now as incumbent 
operators are beginning to deregister services in areas where the 
initial registration was particularly high, and as tender prices 
begin to rise in areas where the inital round saw very low tender 
prices more authorities are now beginning to restate their 
earlier warnings that the maintenance of the network is becoming 
increasingly difficult, and that some groups will be 
progressively deprived. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECT 
Let me now conclude. Deregulation appears to be having 
substantial cost reducing impacts on all operators and be 
increasingly replacing high cost by lower cost operators in parts 
of the tendered market. In the commercial registration field 
there is some reluctance to compete, and where competition does 
occur it is generally on capacity or quality rather than fares. 
Prolonged periods of unsustainable swamping, and a number of 
dubious competitive practices have resulted. Thus while the 
competitive threat is highly credible it is clear that the market 
is not completely contestable in the Baumol sense. 
That being so a number of corollaries can be stated. Whilst we 
may rely on the processes of oligopolistic competition to keep 
down factor costs we cannot rely on them to ensure an optimum 
price/quality combination. Nor does either a highly contestable 
or an oligopolistic market structure generate an equilibrium with 
optimal levels of externality or optimum levels of service 
integration. 
That synthesis tends to confirm my previous judgement that the 
comprehensive competitive tendering would offer the most powerful 
and credible threat to incumbents, whilst retaining the capacity 
to secure optimal degrees of integration. The major weakness of 
it is that it might have attenuated the inducement to service 
innovation which appears to be strong (perhaps even excessively 
so) under the present regime. In political reality an immediate 
move to comprehensive competitive tendering is most unlikely. 
Given that, I believe that four institutional requirements are 
now required in order to get the best out of deregulation; 
(i) Firstly, not only must the initial market structures be 
appropriate, but it will be necessary to maintain a continuing 
control to prevent monopolisation. 
(ii) Secondly, it is necessary to develop an effective set 
of standards for, and control over , competitive practices. 
(iii) Thirdly, the responsible local authorities should be 
given effective means of influencing both the management of bus 
traffic in their area and the protection of service quality and 
cost for deprived areas. 
(iv) Fourthly, and I think essential if the proper degree of 
responsibility is to be returned to the local political 
institutions, ownership of assets and operational responsibility 
must be more cleanly and firmly removed from local political 
influence. 
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